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Abstract 
This paper offers a fresh perspective on the connection between professional work and 
socio-economic inequality by tracing the emergence of the trust and estate planning 
profession in America. Unlike studies of inequality and the professions that focus on 
the status attainment of individuals and their families, or on labor market segregation, 
this paper explores professional work as a means of creating and reproducing larger sys-
tems of socio-economic stratification. Trust and estate planners contribute to macro-
level inequality by helping wealthy clients accumulate large fortunes and pass them on 
to their descendants; this, in turn, has shaped the status and composition of other pro-
fessions. As sources of economic power have changed – moving from land and factories 
to more fungible forms – the need for legal, organizational and financial strategies to 
protect assets from taxation, creditors, and spendthrift heirs intensified, catalyzing the 
transformation of trust and estate planners from amateurs to professionals. Thus, trust 
and estate planners are both products and producers of the changing worlds of work 
and wealth. To shed light on these transformations, this paper will draw on the litera-
tures of sociology, economics and anthropology, focusing on these professionals’ three 
critical roles – as investors, administrators, and guardians of wealth – in reproducing 
systems of stratification. 
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier untersucht die Professionalisierung der Treuhand- und Immobilienver-
waltung in den USA. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Untersuchungen über soziale Ungleich-
heit und Berufsstände, die auf das Erreichen eines bestimmten Status von Individuen 
und deren Familien oder auf Arbeitsmarktsegregation abzielen, werden Berufsgruppen 
hier hinsichtlich ihres Einflusses auf soziale Stratifizierung untersucht. Treuhand- und 
Immobilienverwalter fördern soziale Ungleichheit auf der Makroebene, indem sie wohl-
habenden Klienten helfen, große Vermögen anzuhäufen und diese  ihren Nachkommen 
zu vererben. Dies wiederum hat Auswirkungen auf den Status und die Zusammenset-
zung anderer Berufe. Als die Quellen wirtschaftlicher Macht, früher Landbesitz und 
Industrieeigentum, fungiblere Formen annahmen, stieg der Bedarf an juristischen, or-
ganisatorischen und finanziellen Strategien, Vermögen vor der Besteuerung und dem 
Zugriff durch Gläubiger und verschwenderische Erben zu schützen. Dies beförderte die 
Professionalisierung der Vermögensverwalter und machte sie gleichermaßen zu Pro-
dukten und Produzenten der veränderten sozialen Organisation von Arbeit und Wohl-
stand. Das Papier vergleicht Literatur aus Soziologie, Ökonomie und Anthropologie 
und erklärt die Entwicklungen im Hinblick auf die drei kritischen Rollen der Vermö-
gensverwalter in den verschiedenen Systemen sozioökonomischer Stratifizierung: als 
Investoren, Administratoren und Vermögensverwalter.
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 / 6
Contents
Introduction 5
Trust and estate planning as a profession 8
The intersection of professions and families 10
Impact on stratification and the professions in the United States 13
Professionals as fiduciaries 16
Implications for the study of professions and inequality 23
References 25
Harrington: Trust and Estate Planning 5
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and 
the Max Planck Institute, as well as the helpful comments of Jens Beckert, Guido Möllering and 
Philipp Klages. Please address comments to: harrington@mpifg.de.
Introduction
Professional work has been linked to inequality through decades of research on status 
attainment (Blau/Duncan 1967) and occupational prestige (Abbott 1993). The present 
study takes a somewhat different perspective on that linkage by examining how some 
forms of professional activity reproduce broader patterns of socio-economic stratifica-
tion, with effects beyond the realm of work. That is, through expert use of the law, as 
well as organizational and financial instruments, some professions not only affect the 
status and resources of individual professionals and their families, but can shape op-
portunity structures and inequality at the societal level. 
Trust and estate planning is one such profession, in that it consists of helping wealthy 
people transfer their socio-economic privileges across multiple generations, creating 
enduring clusters of status, capital and resources. Following Abbott’s (1988) call to ex-
amine the professions within an environment of interacting, transprofessional forces, 
this paper examines trust and estate planning as a profession that has contributed at 
multiple levels to enduring inequality in America, from building individual family for-
tunes to the creation of broader class institutions such as trust funds and charitable 
foundations. Not only have they helped concentrate wealth in the hands of a tiny elite, 
but as a consequence of their work, other professions were transformed. However, recent 
years have seen a “falling away of sociological research about class, power and wealth” 
(Gilding 2005: 32). The study of trust and estate planners represents an opportunity to 
revive this line of scholarly inquiry through the theoretical perspective of the sociology 
of the professions. 
Like other professional groups, trust and estate planners are engaged in ongoing ef-
forts to secure their status in the changing world of work; the theoretical interest of 
this group lies in the way their professionalization process intersected with larger pat-
terns of stratification in the United States. As sources of wealth became more fungible 
starting in the post-Civil War era – moving slowly from land and factories to financial 
instruments and intellectual property – the traditional means of holding family for-
tunes together (such as entail, primogeniture and intermarriage) became less effective, 
and the need for expert guidance intensified. By building and managing asset-holding 
structures like trust funds, trust and estate planners ensured the family’s financial secu-
rity, freeing the younger generations from their responsibilities to the family business 
along with the necessity of working for money – what Veblen called “industrial exemp-
tion” (1994 [1899]). On the one hand, these efforts made the “leisure class” possible; 
but they also allowed the well-educated, well-connected children of upper class families 
to enter careers in medicine, the law, politics, the arts and philanthropy. So at the same 
time as the family businesses on which their fortunes had been established were being 
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turned over to professional managers (Berle/Means 1932), many of the families were 
themselves delegating some of their traditional accumulation and redistribution func-
tions to trust and estate planners, with lasting effects on the distribution of wealth and 
the composition of the professions in America.
This paper thus foregrounds the actions and agency of professional work, taking the 
position that “professionals are agents of change and have a degree of control over in-
stitutional and organizational development” (Roberts/Dietrich 1999: 991). In contrast 
to research that examines the way professional work affects the position of individuals 
and families in larger systems of inequality, this study will investigate how some profes-
sions help build those systems. Because trust and estate planners are in the business of 
creating organizational and economic structures that transform one generation’s accu-
mulated wealth into dynastic privilege, members of this profession simultaneously shape 
and are shaped by macro-level patterns of inequality. By tracing the development of trust 
and estate planning from its beginnings as a voluntary, amateur undertaking through 
its modern instantiation as an elite international professional group, this paper seeks to 
expand the theoretical model linking the professions to status and stratification.
Existing research on wealth and families has only hinted at the crucial load-bearing role 
the profession of trust and estate planning plays in supporting socio-economic macro-
structures like stratification regimes. This may be due to the relatively recent emergence 
of the profession. Trust and estate planners only began to take the initial steps toward 
recognition as professional group in the mid-nineteenth century, as a result of rulings 
from the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and then only within the confines of a small 
geographical concentration of American “old money.” The professionalization process 
proceeded quite slowly, such that the group’s only professional society – known as STEP, 
short for the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners – was not established until 1991. 
Since there must be ongoing effort by “the profession to convince the public of the val-
ue of its services and the trustworthiness of its practitioners” (Pescosolido/Tuch/Martin 
2001: 3), trust and estate planning continues to evolve through boundary-setting and 
institutionalization efforts; this has resulted in a membership of 14,000 individuals in 
39 countries, growing at a rate of approximately 1,000 new members per year.1 Be-
cause many of those who practice trust and estate planning are also members of other 
professions, such as accounting and the law, STEP has promoted the term “trust and 
estate planner” as the preferred designation for those specializing in services to wealthy 
families with intergenerational transfers to manage, or those with dynastic aspirations. 
The professional title has been further formalized through the STEP-issued credential 
TEP – short for Trust and Estate Planner – which members who have passed the TEP 
qualifying exams are encouraged to use in the same ways that other professionals use 
the letters CPA or MD after their names. 
1 Details on STEP history and membership from <www.step.org/showarticle.pl?id=60>.
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On the one hand, this timeline of slow development followed by rapid expansion raises 
questions about the process of professionalization: what catalyzed the development of a 
professional class of trust and estate planners after generations of amateur and voluntary 
activity? At the same time, the work of trust and estate planners also provokes questions 
about socio-economic inequality, such as: what can the rise of this profession tell us about 
the way dynastic wealth is made and maintained, despite the myriad of laws and policies 
in place designed to thwart enduring inequality? In the United States, for example, many 
European traditions that perpetuated concentrated wealth – like entail and primogeni-
ture – were abolished within a decade of the Declaration of Independence; yet despite 
these measures, and the later introduction of inheritance and income taxes, levels of in-
equality have remained remarkably stable since the nineteenth century, with 1 percent 
of the population controlling roughly 40 percent of the nation’s wealth (Keister 2005).
In explaining patterns of resource distribution in societies, the 
challenge is to ascertain who makes things endure and how. Far from being automatic, repro-
duction requires appropriate agencies that tap distinct sources of legitimation to render socially 
acceptable the individual transfer of the various forms of social capital owned by individuals or 
groups. (Clignet 1992: 29, emphasis in original)
These “who” and “how” questions point back to the professions, particularly in the 
American case, because socio-economic stratification stabilized around the same time 
in the mid-1800s as trust and estate planning began to professionalize. In this empirical 
setting, the processes of professionalization and stratification are deeply entangled.
To examine these questions, this paper will review the literatures on the professions, 
legal history, and the family from disciplines including sociology, anthropology and 
economics. A guiding motif will be the observation that there is nothing natural or 
inevitable about dynastic wealth and the inequalities it engenders; as anthropologist 
Annette Weiner writes, “The reproduction of social relations is never automatic, but 
demands work, resources [and] energy” (1992: 4). Thus, this paper will assert that the 
work of trust and estate planners is essential to the maintenance of a particular set of 
socio-economic relations, through their expert control over structures that concentrate 
power, status, money and other resources in the hands of their clients. Their history of 
professionalization, and their three critical roles in the global socio-economic system – 
as investors, administrators and guardians of wealth – will be reviewed in the following 
sections.
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Trust and estate planning as a profession
As a large body of research attests, professions are high-status occupations based upon 
expertise certified by formal qualifications, often structured by an apparatus of legal 
regulation (Goode 1960). Work attains professional status over the course of years, 
starting with the establishment of the activity as a full-time occupation, progressing through 
the establishment of training schools and university links, the formation of a professional orga-
nization, and the struggle to gain legal support for exclusion, and culminating with the forma-
tion of a formal code of ethics. (Roberts/Dietrich 1999: 990; Wilensky 1964)
Once established, professions confer status upon their members (Sandefur 2001; Kelley/
Evans, 1993), distributing prestige in ways that create upward mobility crucial to the 
legitimation of inequality in achievement-oriented meritocratic societies. In this sense, 
professions can also play a conservative role in maintaining the stability of social struc-
ture. As shown in a large stream of research starting with Blau and Duncan (1967), 
individuals’ position in the socio-economic order is shaped to a large degree by parents’ 
occupational status, leading to the reproduction of inequalities over time. Labor market 
segregation lends further persistence to stratification through mechanisms such as ste-
reotyping (Gorman 2005) and informal networks (Marsden/Gorman 1998). 
However, the role of some professions in shaping the socio-economic status of oth-
ers – that is, of those outside the professional’s occupation or household – is rarely ex-
amined. Trust and estate planners pose interesting empirical questions for sociological 
theories of the relationship between the professions and stratification regimes because 
their work contributes to broader patterns of inequality. As the architects of large for-
tunes, they create structures to protect their clients’ wealth from tax authorities, credi-
tors, regulators and even spendthrift heirs.
To perform these tasks, these professionals require an unusual mix of skills, including 
mastery of finance and international laws as they relate to taxation, property rights, debt 
and testamentary freedom. Legally and financially, they design the asset-containment 
vehicles which allow “new” money to grow old; culturally and socio-emotionally, they 
are caretakers of family solidarity, charged with preserving a legacy which is more than 
financial (Beckert 2007a). These non-economic aspects of dynastic wealth require trust 
and estate planners to be astute psychologists and mediators, resolving disputes among 
family members and sometimes between the founders of a dynasty and their heirs. 
In cases where the founder is deceased, these professionals assume the mantle of tradi-
tional authority by means of expertise and the powers conferred by the trust instrument 
– in other words, by virtue of rational-legal authority (Weber 1946a). This consolidates 
the power of hired experts over their rich and powerful clients, and thus establishes 
an enduring power base for the profession itself. In this way, the professionalization 
of trust and estate planners is reminiscent of Gouldner’s (1979) account of the rise of 
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“knowledge workers.” Building on Durkheim’s claim in The Division of Labor in Society 
(1933 [1893]) that occupations – including professional work – should be the stan-
dard unit of analysis in the study of modern industrial society, Gouldner argued that 
the development of knowledge work as a profession decisively altered the distribution 
of power envisioned by Marx (1978 [1848]): with the increasing mechanization (and 
computerization) of production, ownership meant little without cooperative experts to 
make the machines work; this gave experts the upper hand over their employers. This 
is, of course, not a new phenomenon: as Weber (1946b [1922]: 233) observed in one of 
his historical studies of bureaucracy, “[t]he treasury officials of the Persian Shah have 
made a secret doctrine of their budgetary art and even use secret script.” But Gouldner 
argued that fundamentally new conditions in the world of work – specifically, the shift 
of economic power from industrial manufacturing to innovation in technology and 
services – put knowledge professions (of which trust and estate planning is surely one) 
on a permanently new footing in the twentieth century. 
Like other professions, trust and estate planners define themselves through the use of 
jargon and procedures that are difficult to grasp without resort to formal training and 
qualification procedures. This is consistent with the process of professionalization in 
other realms: “Decades of research on the occupations and professions suggest that the 
professions have erected barriers to entry through certification requirements and other 
forms of closure” (Rotolo/McPherson 2001: 1115). These boundary-setting efforts are 
aided by monopoly power, since the group has only one professional society worldwide, 
and it alone retains authority to issue the TEP credential. STEP’s success in this profes-
sionalization effort can be gauged not only by its large membership, but by the financial 
industry’s acceptance of the STEP-issued credential as the international standard, on a 
par with the older and more established CPA (Certified Public Accountant) designation, 
created in 1896 (Flesher/Previts/Flesher 1996). As an illustration, Figure 1 shows a 2007 
Figure 1 Classified advertisement
Source: Le Temps (newspaper Geneva, 
Switzerland), November 30, 2007.
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classified advertisement from Le Temps, a leading newspaper in Geneva, Switzerland, 
whose text conveys the high status accorded to the TEP credential in one of the world 
centers of trust and estate planning activity.
The intersection of professions and families
Social hierarchy depends to a significant degree on the transmission of material goods, 
especially within kinship groups (Weiner 1992; Marcus/Hall 1992). The retention of 
such goods within families over multiple generations is particularly critical in ensuring 
the stability of social structure, making the mechanisms and processes of transfer of 
particular interest to social scientists. Societies vary, of course, in the way they manage 
intergenerational transfers, but for contemporary global economic elites, this process 
is often directed by trust and estate professionals. The tools they use serve not only to 
protect the assets of wealthy clients, but to contain “ancestral objects” within structures 
that allow them to be transferred without leaving the family. This process, which has 
been called “the paradox of keeping-while-giving,” means that “Possessions are given, 
yet not given. Some are kept within the same family for generations, with retention not 
movement bestowing value ” (Weiner 1992: 3–4, emphasis added). It is precisely the task 
of trust and estate planners to accomplish this “keeping-while-giving” on behalf of their 
clients, thereby maintaining continuity both for the family they serve and in the larger 
social distribution of status, power and wealth. 
Yet the quasi-familial position of trust and estate planning also raises questions about its 
development into a profession. If, as assumed in economics, the family is the paradigm 
of a high-trust situation for exchanges, while the market represents the low-trust ex-
treme of the continuum (e.g., Ben-Porath 1980), the question arises: why would anyone 
hire professionals to play a lasting role in their family’s financial affairs? While retaining 
legal counsel or consulting a financial adviser commonly leads to short-term relation-
ships between professionals and clients, trust and estate planners are hired for the long 
term, often amounting to lifetime employment. Though they can be fired and replaced 
– on terms specified in the trust instrument and sometimes by the laws of their jurisdic-
tion – they more often keep their job with a family long enough to work with two or 
more generations (Marcus/Hall 1992). Moreover, the legal parameters that define some 
asset-holding structures, like trusts, require the separation of ownership from benefit: 
so while the heirs to a trust may enjoy the income from dynastic wealth, the assets are 
legally owned by the trustee (see Beckert 2007a). Thus, the relationship between trust 
and estate planners and the families they serve goes beyond the norms of professional 
conduct as embodied even by a long-term family physician: while the doctor may be 
privy to highly-sensitive information about a family, she does not own the family’s as-
sets and control the purse strings as trust and estate planners do. 
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So why would a wealthy family, with a lot to lose reputationally and economically, make 
itself vulnerable by bringing a professional trust and estate planner into its midst? This 
question is especially pertinent to the new world of work, given that historically, the 
transfer of assets across generations has been handled as an internal family matter, or – 
when that was impossible or impractical – outsourced to friends and trusted business 
associates who worked without compensation. As Marcus notes in a study of dynastic 
wealth in pre-twentieth-century America, wealthy families kept their fortunes intact 
through “strategies of intermarriage and partnership to offset the fragmentation caused 
by the partible inheritance” (1983: 230). If those options were unavailable or impracti-
cal, they resorted to the medieval English practice of putting their assets in trust, where 
“[t]he trustees were kin of the testator, who had to depend on literal trust and commu-
nity opinion to ensure that the trustees discharged their duties” (1983: 231). Through 
these relatively simple means, great dynastic fortunes in America (as well as in England 
and its other former colonies) endured for centuries, without the aid of professionals. 
Such practices have remained the norm in the majority of intergenerational transfers 
well into the contemporary period. As C. Wright Mills wrote of the mid-twentieth-
century “power elite,” wealthy families found “many ways to … pass on to [their] chil-
dren strategic positions in the apparatus of appropriation” through the exercise and 
transfer of corporate and political power (Mills 1956: 107). Mills would likely have been 
puzzled by the recourse of such elites to professional trustees or estate planners. As he 
saw it, wealth is self-perpetuating in that it “tends also to monopolize opportunities 
for getting ‘great wealth’” (1956: 105): that is, the rich get richer (and can potentially 
turn the wealth of one generation into a dynasty) because their structural position in 
the hierarchy of economic and political power gives them privileged access to means of 
maintaining and increasing their wealth. 
This view is very much in keeping with mainstream economic theories of the family. Of 
particular significance in this connection is the widely-accepted tenet that trust con-
tributes to the overall efficiency of exchange by lowering transaction costs (Williamson 
1981; Coase 1937). In essence, economic theory conceptualizes trust as an asset that, 
while not subject to trade, shapes the conditions (and prices) of other transactions: 
Trust is an important lubricant of the social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of 
trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately this is not a com-
modity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about 
what you’ve bought … It follows from these remarks that, from the point of view of efficiency as 
well as from the point of view of distributive justice, something more than the market is called for.
(Arrow 1974: 23, emphasis added)
An important “something more” is the family, which is expected to have a significant 
advantage over market-based institutions (such as private banks or other for-profit en-
tities) in transmitting accumulated surplus from one generation to the next. 
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Specifically, families can enforce trust (and thereby reliably enjoy the efficiencies atten-
dant upon low transaction costs) by bundling intergenerational wealth transfers with 
other forms of exchange, such as human capital investments and care-giving. The eco-
nomic perspective can be summarized as follows:
Samuelson (1958) pointed out the inability of a market in pure loans to solve such problems 
of intertemporal transfers efficiently … The solution is a “social compact” whereby successive 
generations implicitly agree not to break the chain of giving and receiving … In effecting inter-
temporal transfers and transacting in contingent claims, the child-parent relationship has the 
potential advantage that it is reinforced by other transactions and activities. 
(Ben-Porath 1981: 15)
This system of multiple, mutually-reinforcing commitments can be sustained by the 
family’s social environment in both large ways and small. At the macro-cultural level, 
the power of the family is etched deeply into the Judeo-Christian tradition, with “honor 
your father and mother” ranked fifth among the Ten Commandments, coming just 
after the laws pertaining to God and just before “thou shalt not kill.” Historically, and 
even today in many parts of the world, “the family contract creates a collective social 
identity that affects the transactions of each member with people outside the family” 
(Ben-Porath 1981: 3). This means counting the family name and reputation as a form 
of wealth which could have economic and social value in transactions. But in the con-
temporary developed world, where individuals are less closely tied to their families, and 
families are less likely to be linked permanently to certain tracts of land or communities, 
monitoring becomes increasingly difficult and sanctioning through loss of reputation 
far less effective in enforcing inter-generational contracts.
These observations from economics on the intrinsic advantages of handling inter-
generational wealth transfers within families underscore the puzzling aspects of the 
emergence of trust and estate planning as a profession. Not only does the involvement 
of professionals in the management of family wealth expose the family to non-trivial 
principal-agent problems (Jensen/Meckling 1976), but it would seem to cede the fam-
ily’s most compelling advantages in the economic realm. It is particularly ironic that 
this arrangement should delegate the ultimate responsibility for maintaining a family’s 
culture to non-relatives – professionals who do not partake in the social identity and 
solidarity they are hired to preserve along with the fortune. As Beckert (2007b) points 
out, inheritance is not just a matter of money and law, and cannot be reduced to eco-
nomic terms alone; it also involves the “generational transmission” of beliefs and cogni-
tion (Zucker 1977: 728). All the more reason to wonder at the professionalization and 
expansion of the trust and estate planning profession. 
Of course, as Tolstoy observed, not all families are alike – particularly in their ability to 
enforce trust, and the methods which they employ to do so. Having laid out the appar-
ent puzzle of some wealthy families’ choice to hire an unrelated professional to manage 
their wealth transfers, it must also be acknowledged that the stylized portrayal of family 
relations as universally characterized by high trust and low transaction costs may elide 
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differences that could account to some degree for the adoption of trust and estate plan-
ners as “inside outsiders” (Marcus 1992). The meaning and functioning of the family 
as a governance structure is an empirical question, and while addressing it fully goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, a note of caution is in order going forward. 
On the one hand, family role expectations and relationships vary across history, geog-
raphy, culture and class; on the other hand, the empirical research on families’ relation-
ships with trust and estate planners derives from a very small number of studies involv-
ing American families in the twentieth century. For example, the two studies which form 
the primary sources of information on this subject – those by Hall and Marcus – are 
based on a total of three families: the Rockefellers in the former case, and the Texas oil 
dynasties of the Kempners and Moodys in the latter. While Hall and Marcus went into 
admirable depth with archives and interviews, their conclusions cannot help but be 
limited by when and where their studies were conducted (Blumin 1993; Traube 1994). 
This leaves unresolved several important issues relevant to this study, such as: do trust 
and transaction costs within families change when they accumulate enough wealth to 
pass on to subsequent generations, and how do families change through the adoption 
of trust and estate planners as a component of their cultures and governance structures? 
These questions remain open for future research.
Impact on stratification and the professions in the United States
Trust and estate planners perform their roles through the imposition of rational-legal 
bureaucratic forms upon the family – a social entity generally supposed to be gov-
erned by affection and duties of reciprocity. This collision of value-spheres makes it 
particularly surprising that “in capitalist society, a form of lineage and dynasty finds its 
strength in a mechanism that is defined by a rationality that appears alien to the mix of 
sentiments and self-interest which we think motivates family relations” (Marcus/Hall 
1992: 71). The contradictions are left to be resolved in the person of the trust and estate 
planner, a human bridge spanning many great divides – not least the one between me-
dieval and modern social orders, in which the family as the basic unit of organization 
has given way to corporate/bureaucratic forms. 
As a result of this institutionalized transfer of power, 
families, tied to fortunes that they do not fully control, become complex, if not corporate, orga-
nizations of independent components. These complex “wholes” are, in turn, dependent for their 
solidity and perpetuation on appropriate experts and legal artifice.
(Marcus/Hall 1992: 53, emphasis added)
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Thus, one consequence of the professionalization of trust and estate planners has been 
a restructuring of some families along the kind of management versus ownership di-
vide described by Berle and Means (1932). In fact, as discussed at greater length below, 
the trust and estate planning profession in America grew in parallel with and partly in 
consequence of the rise of merchant fortunes in the late nineteenth century. However, 
the ways in which merchant families underwent a parallel transformation has received 
less notice from social scientists. 
The Rockefeller family was among the first to recognize this transformation. Their fore-
sight was not entirely surprising, given that the family fortune was in part the result of 
innovative use of organizational structure in creating the Standard Oil empire. Transfer 
of these ideas from the management of business capital to the realm of inheritance 
ushered in one of the most significant leaps forward in the professionalization of trust 
and estate planning: the development of the “family office.” This meant that instead 
of trust and estate planners working on a part-time basis for each of several families 
simultaneously, the Rockefellers hired a staff of trust and estate planners to work for 
them full-time, directing a team of other professionals, such as art historians to curate 
the family’s collection of masterworks: 
The most fully developed model for the institutionalization of the great new fortunes was 
framed by John D. Rockefeller, who, in passing his wealth on to his descendants, pioneered the 
mechanisms that, while nominally allowing it to remain under the control of the family, placed 
it increasingly under the management of experts – lawyers, accountants, advisors and consul-
tants. Although a similar distinction between ownership and management had taken place in the 
older metropolitan elites, with the rise of family trustees and incorporated charities, in its earlier 
form the displacement of control had featured a collectivization of the resources of many families, 
whereas in the dynastic setting, it involved only the assets and activities of a single family, usually 
structured around a “family office” that coordinated the management of investments, philan-
thropy and public relations. (Hall/Marcus 1998: 162, emphasis added)
In essence, the Rockefellers built their family wealth by increasing and formalizing – 
through the “family office” – the separation of management from control (Berle/Means 
1932; see also Mizruchi 2004). Other families of fortune have since followed suit, adapt-
ing to the hegemony of the corporate form by turning themselves into quasi-corporate 
entities and giving over ownership of their assets (as well as execution of traditional 
family functions) to the rational-legal authority of professional trust and estate plan-
ners, employed full-time on the family’s behalf. 
Among the most significant changes brought about by this professionalization of trust 
and estate planning was its effect on the trajectory and composition of other professions. 
By taking on responsibilities that had historically been managed within families, trust 
and estate planners freed the sons and daughters of wealthy families to spend their time 
in other pursuits. As Hall observes, this multiplied the division of labor in society:
The specialization of the management of family capital made possible the underwriting of non-
business careers for the descendants of merchants; it was possible for such persons to be rich 
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without having to bear any of the responsibilities of creating and maintaining wealth. In short, 
it is at this point that we begin to see the development of a class out of what had previously been 
a group of persons with common economic interests. (1973: 242)
On the one hand, the professionalization of trust and estate planning helped create 
the American “leisure class” (Veblen 1994 [1899]). Younger generations who had once 
been obliged to assume positions in the family business became “exempt” from a long 
list of economic concerns, including “thrift,” “pecuniary stress,” and “personal contact 
with industrial processes of any kind.” This, in turn, reshaped the status order of the 
modern United States and altered the markers by which individuals could “know their 
place” within the system of socio-economic stratification. Whereas lack of employment 
was previously considered shameful, outsourcing the management of both the family 
business and the family fortune made it possible to argue by the end of the nineteenth 
century that “Leisure is honorable and becomes imperative partly because it shows ex-
emption from ignoble labor” (Veblen 1994 [1899]: 112). 
In addition to shaping the forms taken by the contemporary American class hierarchy, 
Marcus claims, the professionalization of trust and estate planning also led to the influx 
of highly-educated elites into professional employment and philanthropy. Those who 
were not interested in a life of “industrial exemption” were encouraged to take up law, 
medicine or education, “where they would perform cultural and charitable functions in 
society at large without draining the family capital or seeking to interfere with its manage-
ment ” (Marcus 1983: 238, emphasis added). This movement of human capital from pri-
vate to public use had a dramatic effect on the status of the professions, as well as on their 
composition. Elites’ investments in higher education for their sons (and to a lesser extent, 
daughters) had once paid off only in the context of ensuring the future prosperity of the 
family business; but once freed to turn their talents outward, the children of dynastic for-
tunes could contribute their skills and talents to forging a better society. In consequence, 
the nature of the professions themselves changed. For example, medicine was not previously a 
high-status occupation. As the sons of elite families became doctors and philanthropy created 
hospitals for them, the institutions of health and medicine became imbued with an ethic of 
public service … so the professionally active children of Boston families became metaphorical 
fiduciaries of the public order. (Marcus 1983: 238; emphasis added)
As an unintended consequence of the professionalization of trust and estate planning, 
the profession of medicine was also transformed from a low- to a high-status activ-
ity. While this change in the composition and status of some professions was in some 
respects a progressive, democratizing force, it also contributed to elite dominance of 
power and institutions. Among other things, as the new professional cohort of heirs 
to dynastic wealth rose to positions of leadership in their chosen fields, they assumed 
control of material resources vital to the social structure, such as banks, schools and 
hospitals. Others embarked on political careers, or established charitable foundations, 
which enabled them to command symbolic resources such as the definition of “com-
mon good” and “social problems.” 
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Whose interests were being served? Nominally, that of the public, but while there was 
undoubtedly some genuine progressive value in these activities, they also served elites 
by perpetuating the socio-economic stratification to which they (and their families) 
owed their wealth and its attendant privileges. 
The philanthropic foundation … provided a framework in which beneficiaries of family trusts 
could themselves become private fiduciaries, not of family fortunes, but of the public order in 
general. It was this ideological and structural expansion of the fiduciary role … that later gave a 
style to an otherwise difficult-to-define American Establishment. 
(Marcus/Hall 1992: 69, emphasis added)
In a case of isomorphism within the professions (Jepperson 1991; see also Baron/Dob-
bin/Jennings 1986), heirs to dynastic fortunes modeled their behavior as nascent profes-
sionals in the public sphere after the relationships between their families and the fiducia-
ries who managed their fortunes. Thus, Marcus claims, trust and estate planners not only 
built the structures which allowed wealthy families to become enduring dynastic fortunes, 
but modeled the behaviors and ideology that eventually helped these elites enter profes-
sions themselves and consolidate their power. This implies that the current landscape of 
American socio-economic inequality, as well as the composition of the professions, owes 
much to the rise and activities of trust and estate planning as a profession. 
However, the historical and regional limitations of Marcus’ data bear repeating in this 
context: the unique combination of economic, legal, and even ethnic conditions that 
pertained in nineteenth century Boston don’t provide much of a basis for generalization. 
In this light, it seems advisable to treat as provisional his conclusion that the profession-
alization of trust and estate planning provided the model for the American power elite, 
establishing their modus operandi or habitus (Bourdieu 1992). At the same time, to be 
fair to Marcus, he does not suggest – and we should not assume – that the motives of 
these sons and daughters of dynastic wealth were purely altruistic, or even beneficial to 
the societies they inhabited. The connections he draws between the changing composi-
tion and status of the professions, based on data from a narrowly bounded place and 
time, should be tested in other contexts, by future research. 
Professionals as fiduciaries
As trust and estate planning evolved from a voluntary activity to a fully-fledged profes-
sion which acts as the “ideological parent” of capitalist elites (Marcus/Hall 1992: 80), 
its members took on special obligations, even beyond the high standards ordinarily 
applied to the professions. That is because trust and estate planners are fiduciaries: an 
elite within the professional class, whose distinctiveness consists in a unique set of ob-
ligations to their clients. A fiduciary relationship arises only in special circumstances 
– namely, when a client cedes control of assets to a professional who undertakes to hus-
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band them for the client’s benefit. Thus, lawyers or accountants are professionals, but 
do not become fiduciaries until they accept responsibilities such as the management of 
a client’s investments or the acceptance of a director’s position on a corporate board. 
The role of the fiduciary is a central element of common law, and is defined legally by a 
stricter standard of responsibility than that applied to other forms of professional con-
duct. For instance, the fiduciary is forbidden from profiting from client relationships, 
even to the extent of receiving payment for services rendered, unless and only to the 
extent specifically authorized by the principal. Fiduciaries are also required to avoid any 
conflict of interest, putting their clients’ interest above their own in every case. 
Honor, loyalty and discretion are so important to the profession that Marcus and Hall 
compare the role of the trust and estate planner to that of “the consigliere of Mafia 
families” (1992: 83). On the one hand, the analogy seems apt: consiglieri are “advisors 
and ‘men of honour’ … able to ‘mind their own business,’ that is, keep secrets” (Blok 
2002: 110). Though consiglieri may have recourse to violence, while trust and estate 
planners do not, the two groups are measured against similar value criteria. Not only 
are those values of honor, loyalty and discretion enshrined in STEP’s code of profes-
sional ethics,2 they are the foundations of the private banking industry itself, and the 
basis for the historical dominance of places like Switzerland and Liechtenstein in cater-
ing to the financial service needs of wealth dynasties. 
But trust and estate planners are quite unlike consiglieri in one vitally important way: 
as fiduciaries, they cannot profit from their role as advisers except in very limited ways, 
explicitly defined by the client. While consiglieri presumably enjoy generous compen-
sation in return for their loyalty and silence, and can profit from opportunities which 
come their way in the line of duty, trust and estate planners do not and must not. In 
fact, according to the leading professional journal in the field, they earn startlingly little 
for their services: the UK-based STEP Journal’s 2008 figures indicate that most accept 
just £1,000 to £2,000 per year to manage a family trust (Sternberg/Maslinski 2008: 28). 
Thus, in order to make a living, some trust and estate planners manage the finances of 
many different families. Still, this fee schedule compares poorly with the norms of the 
financial industry, but is consistent with the special obligations of fiduciaries. 
Trust and estate planners are therefore in the strange position of being required to en-
gage in their professional activities in the absence of the primary motivation for such 
activities, at least as theorized by economists: self-interest. All considerations of profit 
and advantage are to be viewed entirely in light of their benefit to the client. Trust and 
estate planning thus constitute a “service profession” in the most literal sense, arguably 
giving them as much in common with members of holy orders as with mafia consiglieri. 
Their fiduciary obligations mean that they are “required to become ‘economically celi-
bate:’ barred from being beneficiaries under the trusts that they administered; barred 
2 See <www.step.org/attach.pl/1079/4843/CodeofProfessionalConduct.pdf>, particularly para-
graphs 6, 9 and 11.
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from business activities which might vitiate their loyalties to the interests of the trusts” 
(Hall 1973: 282). In the modern socio-political order, where “economics has become 
the religion of our secular scientific civilization” and economists its “high priests” (Hart 
1990: 138), this quasi-monastic order of fiduciaries completes the market’s “coloniza-
tion of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1985).
In practice, trust and estate planners’ fiduciary duties consist of three distinct compo-
nents: 1) the investor role, which is oriented primarily toward the trust document and 
the client’s assets; 2) the administrator role, oriented toward maintenance of family soli-
darity through mechanisms such as financial distributions (particularly when the trust 
and estate planner has discretionary power over who gets what); and 3) the guardian role, 
oriented toward external challengers (such as regulators and creditors) against whom 
the client’s assets must be protected. The range of skill demands is remarkably broad:
[T]he fiduciary is an investor … the fiduciary is [also] a legal specialist and representative of 
his testator’s plan. He literally realizes that plan for beneficiaries. He explains their rights and 
his duties in translating events in their lives into a calculus of legally regulated financial inter-
ests … In relation to the external society, the fiduciary consistently attends to the boundaries of 
wealth and regulation. (Marcus/Hall 1992: 57)
Each of the trust and estate planner’s roles, and its connection to the emergence of the 
professional, is detailed below.
The investor role
As the legal owners of assets entrusted to them, trust and estate planners are obliged to 
manage those assets in the best financial interests of the beneficiaries, according to the 
instructions set out in the trust instrument, and within the limitations of applicable laws. 
This adherence and allegiance to the terms of the trust instrument is arguably the most 
important measure of a trust and estate planner’s execution of fiduciary duty. The in-
strument, a lengthy legal document which sets out which assets are being put under the 
trust and estate planner’s management and for whose benefit, usually contains provisions 
about how the assets should be invested (if liquid) or managed for profit (if they consist 
of a business or property). In addition, the laws of the jurisdiction provide general guide-
lines for exercising “prudence” and “care” in the management of clients’ assets. Despite 
these constraints, fiduciaries retain a non-trivial degree of autonomy and responsibility, 
as suggested by the elaborate safeguards used to limit their liability for investment losses, 
ranging from “hold harmless” clauses in their contracts with clients, to “E&O” (errors 
and omissions) coverage, which is similar to physicians’ malpractice insurance. 
Autonomy in investment decision-making was an important step in the emergence of 
trust and estate planning as a profession. Until the mid-nineteenth century, and then 
only in Massachusetts, American fiduciaries had no investment discretion over the as-
sets entrusted to them. The law treated them as the amateurs most of them were (as 
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friends or relatives of the settlor), and in the case of liquid assets, restricted them to 
choosing from a menu of investment options considered “prudent” by the state courts 
and legislatures. But because of Massachusetts’ unique concentration of “old money,” it 
led the nation in innovating laws governing wealth, and in establishing trust and estate 
planning as a profession. Most significantly, the state Supreme Court’s watershed deci-
sion in the Harvard College v. Amory case of 1830 represented the first time an American 
court of law “recognized trustees as a putative professional class,” and in so doing, “es-
tablished a clearer separation between the enjoyment of wealth and the management of 
wealth” (Marcus/Hall 1992: 64–65). 
This became increasingly necessary as the nature of wealth itself changed, becoming 
more fungible than ever. Where great fortunes were once instantiated primarily in land 
holdings – rendered impartible through legal mechanisms such as entail and primo-
geniture (Beckert 2007b; see also Gunderson 1998) – industrialization and global trade 
created fortunes out of cash and financial instruments like stocks and bonds. Beginning 
at the end of the eighteenth century (and particularly in the American northeast, where 
land had not been tied up for generations in the hands of hereditary nobility or by plan-
tation farming), trade in textiles, whaling, rum and slaves generated huge profits, and 
with it, the need for advice on the disposition of cash reserves greater than most families 
could spend in a generation. Thus, following the process described by Stinchcombe 
(1965), historical and technological change created the need for new kinds of experts. 
Or as Marcus put it in his study of Texas oil fortunes: 
[U]nder capitalism an increased importance is accorded the fiduciary role precisely because wealth 
is an abstraction that constantly changes its form and is dependent on a coordinating human inter-
mediary to perform these transformations. When the corpus of dynastic wealth could be main-
tained in a concrete form, it was a fixed symbolic resource that gave content to a living tradition 
among family members themselves … It is no accident, then, that trusts should have developed 
in a center of burgeoning activity and structural change among merchants, who, unlike the 
landed gentry of Massachusetts and other states, created intangible wealth as capital, for which 
legal forms and rules had to be invented appropriate to its different uses. 
(Marcus/Hall 1992: 57–62, emphasis added)
In other words, the profession of trust and estate planning emerged concurrently with 
the transformation of capitalism itself. As wealth itself took on new forms, moving 
from land and other material property to merchant capital, the need for expert assis-
tance in growing and maintaining wealth increased as well. 
As family fortunes became more liquid, new institutions and opportunities for profit 
arose through investment offerings by banks and insurance companies. Experts were 
needed to seek out and vet these opportunities, and “trustees … served a critical role as 
mediators who funneled the wealth of private fortunes into key Boston financial insti-
tutions … complet[ing] the institutional integration of a stable capitalist class” (Marcus/
Hall 1992: 65). This, in turn, created a critical mass of loan capital available to finance 
business ventures on a far larger scale than had been possible within the confines of the 
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partnership model. By turning a family’s money into capital, and generating profits that 
could be passed down to subsequent generations, trust and estate planners enacted the 
very process described by Marx in Das Kapital (1992 [1867]) as the “general formula for 
capital”: M→C→M1. This equation crystallized what Marx saw as a fundamental law 
of capitalism, in which M stood for an initial sum of money, C for capital (that initial 
sum money deployed in profit-making activity as opposed to sitting in one’s pocket), 
and M1 represented the initial sum plus profits from the capital investment. 
This “general formula for capital” is also a neat summation of what trust and estate 
planners do, at least since the 1830 Amory decision granted them discretion to choose 
investment opportunities for their clients’ money: that is, to turn accumulated cash into 
capital, and to measure their professional skills in part on the size of M1. In this sense, 
one can link the origins of corporate power in the US – and many dynastic fortunes 
that arose from it – to the trustee-led capitalization of the American financial system 
in the mid-nineteenth century. By translating private fortunes into investments on an 
historically-unprecedented scale, the profession of trust and estate planning deserves 
some of the credit for creating the modern industrial-financial complex. 
The administrator role
Alexis de Tocqueville, observing the birth of American capitalism, wrote that money 
“circulates with inconceivable rapidity, and experience shows that it is rare to find two 
succeeding generations in full enjoyment of it” (1966 [1835]: 53). The challenge facing 
trust and estate planners in the midst of this rapid socio-economic transformation was 
to ensure that a family’s money survived the “inconceivable rapidity” of its circulation 
through the investment cycle so that the intact capital (plus profits) endured to reach 
succeeding generations. In providing a stable environment for a family’s assets, the trust 
and estate planner’s role grew to include stabilizing the family organization in the ser-
vice of preserving its wealth. 
The need for increased administrative control of the family grew apace with the forces 
driving demand for investment advice. Specifically, the more fungible wealth became, 
the less control the owners had over it and their descendents. The future of an entailed 
property was assured by law; but with fortunes derived from merchant capital, anything 
could happen, including the destruction of the carefully accumulated wealth by taxation, 
spendthrift heirs, political upheaval and acts of God. Assets released from primogeni-
ture and other mechanisms that once kept inherited wealth materially and symbolically 
embedded at the center of family life could no longer exert the force that bound previ-
ous generations to one another. Lacking a castle or an estate to lend them weight, the 
disembodied fortunes of merchant capital seemed powerless to prevent families from 
fragmenting as they aged generationally, risking the loss of group identity and status as 
well as capital. The relative importance of these assets is suggested by Weiner’s obser-
vation that “[i]t was fame and honor, rather than pure economics, that [Adam] Smith 
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recognized as the fundamental impetus for the pursuit of wealth” (1992: 36). As the 
dynamic of wealth changed, a need arose for a “governor” (in the mechanical sense) to 
maintain stability within the socio-economic system (Bateson 1972). In the American 
case, the solution was an “apparatus of restraint … governed by professional managers” 
(Marcus 92: 119). 
The fiduciary role is indispensable in making the legal simulacrum of family structure, 
represented by legal entities such as trusts, credible and robust enough to endure over 
multiple generational transitions:
The trust as a reified phenomenon, constructed by the work of the fiduciary, occupies, after the 
death of the family founder, the place of abstract patriarchal authority in a family, but what 
family beneficiaries literally trust is not an object or person imbued with positive family values such 
as love, amity and warm feelings, but a cold, rational construct of wealth – the trust and its trustee – 
that legitimates itself and gains confidence by transcending entirely the arena of family interests 
and emotions. (Marcus/Hall 1992: 70, emphasis added)
Thus, dynastic wealth in the modern era is not a naturally-occurring phenomenon – on 
the contrary, it persists despite a myriad of public policies and laws intended to prevent 
enduring structural inequality – but rather the result of administrative action by trust 
and estate planners. This leads to a remarkable concentration of power in the hands 
of the professionals, in conjunction with increasing dependence by the wealthy upon 
them. For beneficiaries of dynastic wealth, this means that trust and estate planners are 
not just professional service providers who send them money several times a year. Un-
like a banker or a broker, a trust and estate planner stands in relation to beneficiaries 
as “the concrete human incarnation of this abstract functioning of law and money,” as 
well as “the authoritative interpreter, in a legal and capitalist idiom, of a rich family’s 
constitution and development” (Marcus/Hall 1992: 70). In cases where heirs to a fam-
ily fortune are several generations removed from its founder, the professional – as the 
designated surrogate for the founder’s traditional authority – may provide beneficiaries 
their only point of contact with their lineal identity. 
This gives trust and estate planners the power to hold a family together, almost in spite 
of itself, and to confer a type of immortality upon the founder’s legacy. As administra-
tors, these professionals not only mediate relationships among family members, but 
– perhaps more importantly – between a family and its wealth. The result is not just a 
financial management strategy, but “a transcendent version of the family created and 
managed by the fiduciary” (Marcus/Hall 1992: 58). With this kind of professional in-
tervention, the family can become a dynasty, whose structure is more enduring than 
can be created by tradition alone. Thus, as professional administrators, trust and estate 
planners sustain kinship structures that might otherwise disintegrate of their own ac-
cord by recreating endogenously the bonds that the family culture itself once generated 
from within. 
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The guardian role 
As a result of the nineteenth-century court decisions that expanded their powers, trust 
and estate planners became increasingly visible in public life. By advising wealthy fami-
lies on investment opportunities, for example, they garnered the attention and recogni-
tion of major financial, educational and cultural institutions. In this way, their influence 
spread beyond the families they served into the broader socio-economic environment 
they inhabited. In fact, the profession acquired such a high profile that by the early twen-
tieth century, “Trusteeship was both a technique of organization and a basic vision of 
purpose, and as structure and ideology, it has been a pervasive element within wealthy 
family groups as well as within privately funded institutions” (Marcus/Hall 1992: 61). 
At the same time, there was increasing political controversy surrounding the extreme 
inequality and concentration of economic power that developed in America beginning 
in the 1890s, and its possible anti-democratic effects. Eventually, this resulted in two 
developments that directly affected trust and estate planners along with the wealthy 
families they served: in 1913, the right of the federal government to collect income tax 
on a permanent basis was established by Constitutional Amendment; soon thereafter, 
in 1916, Congress created the country’s first permanent estate tax regime. (Previously, 
both forms of tax had been collected by the federal government to raise emergency 
funds, as in wartime, but the practice was understood as temporary.) If a family didn’t 
of its own accord go from “clogs to clogs” or “shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves” in three gen-
erations, the two new tax levies were there to help along the dissolution of any accumu-
lated wealth that might have passed to lineal descendants. These developments in law 
and public policy dramatically increased the dependence of wealthy families upon the 
trust and estate planning profession:
Whereas a dynastic family can be held together without strong family leadership, it cannot 
survive without a fiduciary, whose primary task is to organize generational transitions. These 
are drawn-out processes that are not limited to a brief span of time … As the family leader orga-
nizes family personnel, the fiduciary translates this organization into a financial structure. 
(Marcus 1992: 59, emphasis added)
Asset-holding structures like trusts protected dynastic wealth from much of the new tax 
burden by transferring legal ownership to the trustee while allowing the equity owners 
(usually the heirs to the family fortune) to enjoy the use and benefits of the assets. The 
professional trust and estate planner was then empowered to place the assets strategi-
cally, using expert knowledge of legal and financial systems to retain as much wealth as 
possible within the family. 
In theory, the deployment of tax shelters and related asset-protection measures could be 
accomplished without professional intervention; and many people, historically as well 
as in the present, devise and execute their own plans for wealth preservation. However, 
when assets are complex (e.g., distributed over cash, securities, art and property) or are 
located in more than one country (and therefore subject to more than one taxation and 
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regulatory regime), understanding and using the rules can be onerous. And the larger the 
fortune, the more there is at stake. Factor in that the rules often conflict, and change rap-
idly as jurisdictions compete for the custom of high net worth individuals and families, 
and the necessity of full-time professional management becomes apparent. As economic 
activity grows increasingly global in scope, it is likely that dynastic wealth will rely to an 
even greater extent on trust and estate planners to manage the intersection of the private 
world of the family with the complexities of international taxation and regulation.
Implications for the study of professions and inequality
The study of trust and estate planning represents an opportunity to develop sociological 
theory at the interface of three major areas of inquiry in the discipline: the professions, 
the economy and the family. The sociology of the law and organizations are also im-
plicated, since this research addresses the formal means of articulating the relationship 
between family and property, shedding light on how law “operates in the economy on 
an everyday basis” (Swedberg 2003: 30). In many modern democratic societies, dynastic 
fortunes would probably cease to exist absent the intervention and assistance of trust 
and estate planners. As we can observe in countries like the United States, extreme so-
cio-economic inequality persists despite the abolition of traditional legal mechanisms 
for preserving and perpetuating dynastic wealth, and the enactment of new laws and 
policies specifically designed to prevent multi-generational concentration of resources. 
In the effort to explain the robustness of the American stratification system, research on 
the profession of trust and estate planning can provide valuable insight. 
By deploying the legal, organizational, and financial tools that transform capital ac-
cumulations into dynastic fortunes, trust and estate planners play an important role in 
preserving the economic components of family wealth, along with their cultural and 
symbolic resources, such as social networks and reputation. These dynasties can literally 
become “pillars of society” – concentrations of power and privilege that lend stabil-
ity to larger systems of stratificaion. Even in a society nominally committed to socio-
economic mobility, families like the Rockefellers and Kennedys remain at the top of the 
class hierarchy well past the proverbial third-generation limit. When trust and estate 
planners help wealthy families transfer capital (economic, social and cultural) from one 
generation to the next, the social effects may be profound and far-reaching: influencing 
whom beneficiaries meet and marry, the professions they enter, as well as the organiza-
tions and institutions they create. Thus, through their influence on the composition 
and socio-economic activities of elites, trust and estate planners can contribute to pat-
terns of stratification at the macro-level. Finally, as fiduciaries, Marcus suggests that 
these professionals have contributed to the “ideology of moral leadership” (1992: 78) 
needed to justify and sustain such extreme and enduring inequality in meritocratic, 
achievement-based societies. 
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Many of these claims and implications are difficult to evaluate because they stem from 
such a small dataset of archival and interview research on American families, often in 
historical and geographical circumstances which do not seem readily generalizable. In 
fact, this study is limited by the limited literature on which it is based. One of its goals, 
then, must be not only to synthesize that literature, but to provide a critical analysis that 
points out the issues on which new research is most needed.
Future research within the sociology of the professions could explore the modes and 
rhetorics of legitimation trust and estate planners have used under varying economic 
and social conditions to negotiate the public-private boundaries where their work takes 
place. Picking up on Marcus’ claims about the profession serving as a role model for 
the American ruling class, new studies on trust and estate planners could compare the 
terms in which it and other elite professions have made their interests (or those of dy-
nastic wealth) palatable to representatives of the public interest. Another theoretically 
interesting approach is suggested by earlier work on changes in the discourse of mana-
gerial control over labor from the Great Depression through the Reagan era (Barley/
Kunda 1992); drawing on this model, future research could examine changes in the 
way that trust and estate planning has sought to legitimate itself and its clients’ dynastic 
wealth in relation to larger concerns about socio-economic stratification and equality 
of opportunity. This is a particularly timely issue, because in the current global financial 
crisis, the profession faces significant challenges from the OECD, representing member 
nations who claim that trust and estate planners are helping their wealthiest citizens 
avoid paying their fair share of taxes. Sociological research could examine the strategies 
the profession is using to counter the perception of their work as aiding and abetting tax 
evasion, as well as money laundering and other illegal activity (Rawlings 2007). 
This paper suggests future directions for other domains of sociological inquiry as well. 
Family sociologists, for example, might investigate the effects that professional manage-
ment of their private wealth has on elite families. One line of reasoning would predict 
that inserting this bureaucratic element into kinship structures would have a corro-
sive effect, following the well-known argument that capitalism leaves “no other bond 
between man and man but crude self-interest and callous ‘cash payment’” (Marx/En-
gels 1978 [1848]: 488). On the other hand, economists since Alfred Marshall in the late 
nineteenth century have argued that inheritance strengthens intergenerational ties, and 
empirical research has found a “strong positive correlation between parents’ bequeath-
able wealth … and the number of visits that children paid parents” (Bernheim/Schleifer/
Summers 1985: 1075; see also Dunn 1980); however, these studies did not control for 
professional management of the family’s wealth, leaving open the question of trust and 
estate planners’ effects on socio-emotional bonds among relatives. 
Finally, the profession holds considerable interest for economic sociology through its 
power in the private distribution of resources. It would be valuable to explore how 
much discretion contemporary trust and estate planners have in allocating wealth: the 
extent to which they use that authority to make charitable distributions versus inter-
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generational transfers could have a significant effect on patterns of inequality. At the 
international level, the globalization of the profession raises questions about the gener-
alizability of the American model: for example, future research could test whether the 
use of trust and estate planners was directly proportional to a nation’s level of economic 
inequality. If so, we would expect developing countries, where concentrations of wealth 
are currently most extreme (Chotikapanich et al. 2007), to be the most active sites of 
professional activity for trust and estate planners – an implication supported by anec-
dotal evidence from the STEP Journal. It would appear that in the new world of global 
markets, the trust and estate planning profession remains both a consequence and a 
cause of socio-economic change under capitalism. 
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